6 For a good survey of the development of contemporary originalist theory, see Lawrence B. Solum [G] overnment is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers,' which means that [e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of' those powers."). 9 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956-57 ("We have since made clear that, in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.") (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) ("using term 'means-end rationality' to describe the necessary relationship"); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) ("holding that because 'Congress had a rational basis' for concluding that a statute implements Commerce
II. WHAT COMSTOCK SAYS (AND DOESN'T SAY)
The contrast and relation between theory and doctrine is particularly sharp in the pairing of originalism and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine because it embodies the contrast between the public and express (in the case of original public meaning originalism) and the implicit and unsaid (in the case of incidental power of the Necessary and Proper Clause). Contemporary originalism typically casts constitutional meaning in terms of the original public meaning of the provision(s) in question. 12 This originalism typically finds this meaning mainly in roughly contemporaneous dictionaries, documents, and public speeches and proceedings, and other items of this sort. 13 Comstock is not at all an originalist opinion on this description, but the Court's landmark Second Amendment decision, District of Columbia v. Heller, 14 very much is. 15 Despite these differences, both opinions are similarly afflicted with basic disagreements over the meaning of the constitutional provisions in question in large part because the meanings of the terms used therein are multiple and 12 For a discussion of the rise of original public meaning originalism, see Lawrence B. Solum, supra note 6, at 22-24. 13 Justice Scalia refers to all of these as evidence of original public meaning in writing for the Court. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) ("Before addressing the verbs 'keep' and 'bear,' we interpret their object: 'Arms.' The 18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined 'arms' as 'weapons of offense, or armour of defense' . . . The term was applied, then as now, to weapons that were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity."); Id. at 582 ("The phrase "keep arms" was not prevalent in the written documents of the founding period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing the right to "keep Arms" as an individual right unconnected with militia service."); see also Id. contested, 16 regardless of their method of derivation. Neither approach, it seems, guarantees consensus.
Let us look, then, at Comstock and briefly compare it to Heller in order to examine how the two opinions derive and argue for (and over) constitutional meaning and then to suggest how conflicts and disagreements might be resolved, or at least lessened. The constitutional discussion in Comstock begins with a statement of the question presented in the case-"whether the Necessary and Proper Clause…grants Congress authority sufficient to enact the statute before us." 17 After announcing an affirmative answer to this question, the Court continues, "We base this conclusion on five considerations, taken together."
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The first and most important of these five considerations is that "the Necessary and
Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation." 19 In his subsequent explanation and justification of this assertion, however, Justice Breyer does not parse the text of the clause; neither does he argue the original public meaning of the clause. 20 Instead, he jumps to 1819, rather than 1787, and starts his discussion by quoting from Chief 16 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 ("First, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation."); see also Id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 413-15) ("Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the word 'necessary' does not mean 'absolutely necessary.'"); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 ("The two sides in this case have set out very different interpretations of the Amendment. Petitioners and today's dissenting Justices believe that it protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service. Respondent argues that it protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.") (citations omitted). 17 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (citation omitted). 18 It is not clear from this statement just how these factors are to be weighed and combined. In his dissent, Justice Thomas asks, "Must each of these five considerations exist before the Court sustains future federal legislation as proper exercises of Congress' Necessary and Proper Clause authority? What if the facts of a given case support a finding of only four considerations? Or three? And if three or four will suffice, which three or four are imperative?" Id. at 1975 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). These and other related questions are never dealt with, let alone answered, in the course of Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court. 19 Id. at 1956. 20 In contrast, writing for the Court in Heller, Justice Scalia parses the text of the Second Amendment and offers his explanation of its original public meaning. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)) ("In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ' [t] he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.'").
the Necessary and Proper Clause itself, are used to define the general parameters of Congress's constitutional power. This stands in stark contrast to the originalist cast of Justice Scalia's Second Amendment in Heller. 28 But the Comstock Court does not stop there; these quotations from McCulloch are not the Court's last word on the meaning and scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Instead, the Court goes on to take its current doctrine from more contemporary cases that "look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power." 29 This "rationally related" test is then equated with "means-ends rationality."
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What is the relationship for the Comstock Court of the "definitive" McCulloch language and the modern "rationally related" and "means-ends rationality" tests? The implication, but not the explicit assertion, of the Court's opinion, given the absence of any differentiation or explanation, is that there is no conflict between these three versions of the Necessary and Now, if one takes the word "appropriate" to mean the same as the phrase "necessary and
proper," as is suggested by the use of the word "appropriate" in the enforcement provisions 31 See id. at 1956 ("But the law need be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there be an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.") ( 44 is briefer and less contested. The second factor, the "long history of federal involvement in this area" is clearly met. 45 The third factor, the "sound reasons for the statute's enactment," taken by the Court in the sense of policy reasons rather than constitutional reasons, is also clearly met.
While the second and third factors, on their face, call for factual rather than legal or constitutional determinations, the constitutional question confronting us here is whether these factors are justified, not merely whether they are factually met in this case. Kennedy's position on this issue dominates Justice Thomas' not only despite the fact that it is more difficult and controversial to apply, but also because of this fact. It does so because it embodies and negotiates a fundamental paradox of legal and constitutional argument.
Arguments are chosen because they lead to desired conclusions, but the assertion of that tendency cannot be put forward in the argument as the reason to accept the conclusion; some independent value must be put forward instead. Recall that under the argumentative theory of reason, the purpose of reasons in argument is to support conclusions already held and to lead others to those conclusions, too, not to formulate or test those conclusions/intuition for oneself in the first place. So, this is a matter of indirection rather than deception. Justice Scalia clarifies the issue in another place, though, where he says that originalists "look for a sort of 'objectified' intent-the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris." 60 His approach here has also been adopted by other prominent originalists. 61 Although the original public meaning of the Constitution may often run no further than the plain meaning of the relevant clause, sometimes, when the plain meaning is inadequate or unacceptable, then a broader, more holistic, approach to meaning determination will be required. today, the meaning of the federal Constitution. Thus, when interpreting the Constitution, the touchstone is not the specific thoughts in the heads of any particular historical people-whether drafters, ratifiers, or commentators, however distinguished and significant within the drafting and ratification process they may have been-but rather the hypothetical understandings of a reasonable person who is artificially constructed by lawyers. The thoughts of historical figures may be relevant to the ultimate inquiry, but the ultimate inquiry is legal.") (citations omitted). 66 See, e.g., id. at 73 ("In sum, the hypothetical 'We the people of the United States' is a pretty good fit with the reasonable person of law. This person is highly intelligent and educated and capable of making and recognizing subtle connections and inferences. This person is committed to the enterprise of reason, which can provide a common framework for discussion and argumentation. This person is familiar with the peculiar language and conceptual structure of the law. 'We the people of the United States' is a formidable intellectual figure."). 67 As, for example, Justice Scalia does in his Heller opinion. Of course, this tendency to find but one meaning of a constitutional provision is not peculiar to practitioners of originalism. See Heller at 577 (citing United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931) ("In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.'").
In contrast, the actual people of the United States in the founding era did not come to a common agreement concerning the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause; instead, they disagreed sharply over the meaning of the clause. 68 Moreover, this disagreement has continued, in one form or another, to the present day. 69 Given this fact, the device of the reasonable person here serves more to help paper over the absence of original public meaning consensus 70 than it does to actually determine that public meaning. Any realistic and accurate notion of original public meaning must theorize and explain, rather than just try to explain away, the actual historical disagreements which have occurred concerning constitutional meaning.
Also worth noting concerning the reasonable person device here are the attributes that this person possesses. The reasonable person used here is decidedly not the average person of that time, unless the United States of 1788 was the Lake Wobegon of its day. 71 Recall that the reasonable person is said to be highly intelligent, well educated, committed to reason and familiar with law-to name only a few cited characteristics. 72 The problem here is not just that the typical person of the founding era (or any era) may not possess these qualities, but also that this description skews the source or evidence of original public meaning toward a political and economic elite and away from the general citizenry.
In fact, the reasonable person device of the New Originalism serves to resurrect some of the same problems that caused originalism to abandon its focus on framers' intent as the source of constitutional meaning and switch to original public meaning in the first place. Two questions which bedeviled framers' intent originalism were "Whose intent counts?" and "How is that intent to be determined?" The framers wrote and adopted the Constitution, but it was the ratifiers, acting in the name of "We the people," who gave it force. 73 This leads us to the conclusion that it is the understanding of the ratifiers and the people which is more relevant to constitutional meaning than the intent of those in the convention that framed the document. intent was the currency of originalism, it could at least be argued that a larger group (e.g., "We the people") had delegated their intention-votes to a smaller group (e.g., members of the state ratification conventions) in a sort of proxy process. While this move is possible in a 73 As Richard Kay says on this topic, "If the force of the Constitution is its endorsement by 'the people,' then, given the ratification process, only the ratified text may claim that approval." Richard S. Kay, supra note 63, at 706. 74 Here, Richard Kay says, " It is true that only a text is presented for ratification and….only that process can set the relevant meaning….The intentions of the proposing convention of 1787 are useful only because they help us understand what the state ratifying conventions probably intended when they made the Constitution. Ratification was an intentional act and we cannot understand what it accomplished independent of what the people involved in it thought they were doing." Id.
75 This leads us into the quasi-theological question of the extent to which this artificial construct, the reasonable person, is like or unlike natural persons in its attributes, integrity and unity. If the description of the reasonable person is tweaked, in response to the criticism raised here, to allow it to possess things such as multiple intents, meanings and understandings, then it ceases to be a recognizable individual person and instead becomes some sort of collective or group mind. But if it is not so tweaked, it cannot adequately process and resolve the multiple and conflicting meaning of the constitutional text during the founding era or since.
framers' intent version of originalism, 76 this argument is not available to defenders of original public meaning methodology for at least two reasons. One is that the reasonable person is not a real person, but rather an artificial construction, so that we do not have two actual people (or groups of people) to delegate and receive the delegation as an historical act in space and time; we have only one artificial person. A second, independent reason is that original public meaning, as opposed to intent, is not the possession of any particular person or group of persons-it is, in effect, in the air.
Even if the problems in the last paragraph can be satisfactorily resolved, there remain important evidentiary difficulties. Although we have too much evidence of public meaning in the sense that we find public meanings rather than a single meaning, there is also a sense in which the New Originalism suffers from a dearth of evidence of founding era meaning. The historical record that we possess reflects only the relatively small number of adoption and ratification participants who spoke their minds about the Constitution, thus leaving us only to guess or presume as to what the others thought the document meant. This problem only becomes more severe as the size of the group (adopters, ratifiers, "We the people") increases.
A defender of the New Originalism is forced to the fallback position that the intent of the members of the smaller group is somehow representative of that of the larger group. 77 But this conclusion is an act of faith rather than a determination based upon evidence. 1978) ) ("The 18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined 'arms' as 'weapons of offence, or armour of defence.'"); Id. (quoting 1 A New and Complete Law Dictionary) ("Timothy Cunningham's important 1771 legal dictionary defined 'arms' as 'any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.'"); Id. at 584 (quoting 1 Dictionary of the English Language 106 (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978)) (At the time of the founding, as now, to 'bear' meant to 'carry.'"). 82 Saul Cornell, supra note 80, at 298. He goes on to explain that, "Originalist faith in simply scouring the dictionary as a shortcut around the laborious process of doing genuine historical research rests on a serious misunderstanding of the history of dictionaries. The first American dictionaries were published after ratification. Early dictionaries, including the first American dictionaries, were not compiled according to the rules of modern lexicography. These texts were idiosyncratic products of their authors, who often had ideological and political agendas. As a general rule, such dictionaries were more prescriptive than descriptive. It is simply anachronistic to argue that one ought to consult historical dictionaries from the Founding era to elucidate a set of fixed linguistic facts that can be used to unravel the meaning of the text of the Constitution." Id. argue instead that historical understanding is more complicated and more nuanced than merely consulting a dictionary or other reference work.
You can get a sense of the problem and the argument Cornell and other legal historians have here with the New Originalist methodology by analogizing dictionary-based originalism by going to a foreign country, say Germany, whose language you do not speak, and expecting to get by there with nothing more than a English-German dictionary for help. 83 In that situation, you would doubtless find that one language just does not translate into another on a strictly word-by-word basis. There are grammatical, idiomatic, cultural, and historical differences (to name only a few) that complicate translation and understanding between languages and which defeat a simple dictionary translation methodology. More relevant to originalism, the same is also true for historical understanding, even historical understanding of our own country and legal system.
As a result of these complexities, it is the case that, even if we could remedy the shortcomings of the old dictionaries of which Cornell complains by somehow bringing them up to contemporary lexicographical standards, other important problems would still remain.
In illustration please consider, if you will, this example: Justice Scalia, writing the opinion of the Court in the Heller case, purports to draw the constitutional meaning of the Second Amendment, in significant part, from dictionaries of the founding era. In response, in his dissent, Justice Stevens rails against the Court's "atomistic" originalism, 84 which, he feels, 83 Leaving aside any pronunciation issues and assuming that you are not aided by bi-lingual Germans, but have to get by on your own. 84 Heller, 554 U.S. at 652 (footnote 14) (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing the poems of John Godfrey Saxe 135-136 (1873)) ("The Court's atomistic, word-by-word approach to construing the Amendment calls to mind the parable of six blind men and the elephant, famously set to verse by John Godfrey Saxe); Id. at 643 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)) ("The preamble thus both sets forth the object of the Amendment and informs the meaning of the remainder of its text. Such text should not be treated as mere surplusage, for '[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.'"); Id. ("The Court today tries to denigrate the importance of this clause of the Amendment by springs from a similar mindset and has the same defects as the English-German dictionary example I have just given. 85 In order to explore whether these issues arising with original public meaning originalism can be ameliorated, we turn next to the more limited context of the original public meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The difficulties to be overcome here include the existence of multiple and conflicting meanings of the constitutional terms employed, getting beyond atomistic "dictionary" originalism, and relating original public meaning to later constitutional doctrine.
beginning its analysis with the Amendment's operative provision and returning to the preamble merely "to ensure that our reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose." That is not how this Court ordinarily reads such texts, and it is not how the preamble would have been viewed at the time the Amendment was adopted.") (citation omitted). 85 Id.at 645-46 ("As used in the Fourth Amendment, "the people" describes the class of persons protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by Government officials. It is true that the Fourth Amendment describes a right that need not be exercised in any collective sense. But that observation does not settle the meaning of the phrase "the people" when used in the Second Amendment. For, as we have seen, the phrase means something quite different in the Petition and Assembly Clauses of the First Amendment. Although the abstract definition of the phrase "the people" could carry the same meaning in the Second Amendment as in the Fourth Amendment, the preamble of the Second Amendment suggests that the uses of the phrase in the First and Second Amendments are the same in referring to a collective activity."). 86 Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 ("The phrase 'keep arms' was not prevalent in the written documents of the founding period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing the right to 'keep Arms' as an individual right unconnected with militia service.); Id. (quoting 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 55 (1769)) ("William Blackstone, for example, wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties, one of which was that they were not permitted to 'keep arms in their houses.'"). 87 See id. at 616 ("Every late-19th-century legal scholar that we have read interpreted the Second Amendment to secure an individual right unconnected with militia service."); Id. at 618-19 (quoting J. ORDRONAUX, CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 241-242 (1891)) ("All other post-Civil War 19th-century sources we have found concurred with Cooley. One example from each decade will convey the general flavor: . . . 'The right to bear arms has always been the distinctive privilege of freemen. Aside from any necessity of self-protection to the person, it represents among all nations power coupled with the exercise of a certain jurisdiction. . . .[I]t was not necessary that the right to bear arms should be granted in the Constitution, for it had always existed.'").
IV. THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE A. Three Original Meanings of The Necessary and Proper Clause
Let us now take stock of where we stand on the New Originalism and the Necessary and
Proper Clause and also on the dilemma that we face in reconciling them with one other. In constitutional argument, original public meaning is one of those independent, reasonproviding values which, at least potentially, enables argument to get beyond the "looking for one's friends" level. 88 But the strength of the reason this value can provide is greatly dissipated in a particular situation when, as is the case here, original public meaning gives ambiguous and conflicting counsel, thus raising the "looking for one's friends" danger all over again. However, it would seem that the strength of the reason that original public meaning potentially provides can be restored to the extent that the conflict of counsel can be resolved in some principled, non-tendentious manner. This can be done, I will now argue, by moving beyond original public meaning itself and demonstrating larger continuities and consistencies among the several conflicting meanings. The Necessary and Proper Clause will provide the context for this demonstration.
The conflicting meanings of the Necessary and Proper Clause presented by the Court in
Comstock have been discussed above. They run from absolute necessity at the narrowest end of the meaning spectrum 89 to a middle position which holds that congressional power is not unlimited, but must be telically connected to the means in question, 90 and lastly to the rationally related test at the broadest end of the meaning spectrum. 91 Only two of these three meaning candidates are actually affirmed by any of the Justices; none of them holds that "necessary" in the clause means "absolutely necessary."
An examination of the original public meaning candidates for the clause also breaks down into the same three categories, but with some important variations and one significant difference. Roughly the same three meaning candidates are suggested and again only two of the three are affirmed--but not the same two as in Comstock. In the founding period, some framers held the "absolutely necessary" view of the clause and others argued for the middle, telically related interpretation, but none argued that the clause be interpreted so as to give Congress unlimited power (although some saw a danger that it might be so interpreted and raised this possibility as an argument against the ratification of the Constitution).
This exposition here seeks only to classify, rather than to collect, original meanings-the collection has already been done by Randy Barnett and others. 92 Because Barnett writes on both the methodology of the New Originalism and on the original public meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, I will focus on his writing, to the relative exclusion of the writings of others, in my discussion of these two topics.
89 See supra, note 25 and accompanying text. 90 See supra, note 38-41 (stating, in different ways, that the Necessary and Proper Clause give Congress only a limited power to enact legislation).
91 Supra, note 29 ("the Court goes on to take its current doctrine from more contemporary cases which 'look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.'"). 92 See, e.g. Randy E. Barnett, supra note 88 at 153-90; see also 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 238-277 (Philip Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987). necessary" 94 ), and figures like Hamilton and Marshall, who, less demandingly, said that "necessary" instead means "conducive to" or "convenient." 95 The crucial difference between the two views is that while Jefferson and company drew a sharp distinction between that which is necessary and that which is merely convenient, 96 Hamilton and his later followers treated "necessary" and "convenient" effectively as synonyms. 97 In this way, they inaugurated the perpetual constitutional debate over the nature of the means-ends connection required by the Necessary and Proper Clause, a debate which has continued to the present day, and two important positions in it.
But there is a third position in this debate, one which is neglected by Barnett, perhaps because those who spoke of it feared it rather than embraced it. Anti-Federalist opponents of the proposed Constitution reserved special scorn for provisions of that document such as the between 1728 and 1800. 110 In this way, he was able to show that the meaning of "commerce" in the particular context of the ratification of the Constitution was consistent with its everyday meaning.
111
Why does Barnett, despite his avowed New Originalist interpretive methodology, focus on the constitutional ratification debate here rather than on the everyday meaning of "necessary" at the time? Is he right to do so? Perhaps the reason is that the meaning of "necessary" (and "proper" for that matter) in the constitutional ratification context was greatly affected by that context and, as a result, took on specialized senses which differed from their ordinary, everyday meanings. Even so, this is heresy for New Originalism's reasonable person approach, which disdains this sort of meaning. 112 This is not to say, however, that this contextual ratification meaning is a secret meaning, one known only to a small group of framers and ratifiers and unknown to the general citizenry. "We the people" could hardly have ratified meanings they had not heard and did not know. But technical meaning does not necessarily mean secret or unknown meaning. Technical meanings can be generally known (to some degree, at least) and, so, can be adopted. I am arguing that this is what happened with the Necessary and Proper Clause and, although he does put it this way and may not even realize it, so does Professor Barnett! My argument here is not that constitutional meanings are always technical or special.
That assertion is no more true than its opposite-the position that constitutional meanings are always ordinary, general meanings (which is, after all, a fair reading of the reasonable person New Originalist methodology adopted by Barnett and others). Instead, I argue only that some constitutional meanings are more technical or specialized than others and further that the distinction may be a matter of degree rather than a bright line difference. The Constitution, for example, gives Congress the power "To define and punish….Offenses against the Law of Nations." 113 No one argues that we may determine the content of that provision merely by finding the ordinary founding era ordinary meanings or dictionary definitions of the words "law," "and" and "nations" as Justice Scalia does, for example, with the words "keep,"
"bear" and "arms" in the Second Amendment in his opinion of the Court in the Heller case. 114 This is because the notion of the law of nations was and is clearly a technical legal/philosophical concept rather than an ordinary term; 115 the status of the three Second Amendment terms discussed by Justice Scalia, however, is far more debatable.
Despite his methodological commitment to taking terms used in the Constitution according to their ordinary, founding era meaning, Professor Barnett does not do this in his search for the original public meaning of the terms of Necessary and Proper Clause. Instead, he analyzes mainly technical, contextual meanings for these terms, that is, legal meanings relating to and/or arising out of the constitutional adoption and ratification process. 116 The individuals whose statements he examines are largely important participants in that process. 117 It is no surprise that the conclusion he reaches, one of moderate necessity, rather than one of absolute necessity or mere convenience, departs from the ordinary, dictionary 113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 114 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581-592. In his survey, Justice Scalia consults a variety of sources including legal and other dictionaries, legal commentaries and treatises, cases, statutes, and constitutions. 115 Coincidentally, in the course of his just mentioned discussion of the original meaning of the phrase "keep and bear arms" Justice Scalia also cites a work which significantly influenced western ideas of the law of nations near the time of the founding-Vattel's 1792 treatise, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature. See id. at 587 n. 10. 116 See Randy E. Barnett, supra note 88, at 155-177. 117 In the pages cited in the immediately prior footnote, Professor Barnett focuses most on the statements of prominent Founders such as Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and Edmond Randolph.
meaning of "necessary" of the time. Yet, Barnett's conclusion is correct as a matter of the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause; what needs to change is his theory of originalism and that is precisely what is proposed in the next section of this article. In this change, Barnett's reasonable person originalism is transformed into a dialogic originalism and, further, it is argued that original public meaning can sometimes, as it does here, include legal/constitutional meaning. And, as an added bonus, the fuzzy "somewhere" in the definition of Barnett's moderate necessity, one lying somewhere between absolute necessity and mere convenience, 118 will be rendered substantially less indeterminate.
B. Public Meaning and Legal Meaning
The inquiry concerning the relation of public meaning and legal meaning starts with to determine what the public actually knew and understood about the meaning of specific parts of the Constitution at the time they were enacted. If most of the public in fact knew little or nothing about the constitutional provision in question, it may be difficult or impossible to determine its original meaning. At the very least, the original meaning might turn out to be very imprecise, especially in cases where the text is ambiguous enough to admit more than one possible interpretation. The evidence of extensive public ignorance on even very basic political issues suggests that such situations might well be quite common. Yet none of the rapidly growing literature on original meaning has so far grappled with the reality of widespread public ignorance and its implications for originalism."). 122 See, e.g., Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, supra note 65, at 73 ("In sum, the hypothetical 'We the people of the United States' is a pretty good fit with the reasonable person of law…. This person is familiar with the peculiar language and conceptual structure of the law.").
merely "looking for one's friends," but actually stipulating their presence, i.e., jumping straight to a desired conclusion. This worry is not limited to Lawson and Seidman's version of the reasonable person originalism, but applies to New Originalism generally. It arises from the doubt that this reasonable person accurately reflects the general understanding.
Originalists have a dilemma here. The reasonable person is either a fraud or an unnecessary creation. For if the reasonable person does not accurately reflect the general understanding of the citizens of the founding era, or that understanding cannot be sufficiently determined, then it is a fraud. On the other hand, if the reasonable person does accurately reflect that understanding, it is unnecessary because the general meaning can be directly accessed.
So, the answer to the first question about reasonable person originalism is that legal meaning can be assimilated to it, but only with great practical and theoretical difficulty. This To give this description a more definite illustration, put it in the context of the adoption and ratification of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Recall that the three main conflicting meanings of "necessary" in that process were "necessary" as absolutely necessary, as moderately necessary, and as merely convenient. To put it in terms of a phrase popularized by Ronald Dworkin, necessity was and is a contested concept. 126 In this debate competing groups had different conceptions of necessity. These conceptions did not exist in a vacuum, but instead spoke to and competed with one another. In the debate over the meaning of the word "necessary," political, semantic, historical, textual and other factors interacted to give 124 I have connected this result to the New Originalist adoption of the reasonable person device. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text. 125 See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and Critique, B. U. L. REV. 7-9 (analyzing originalism as "content-based positivism"). 126 In a passage using chess as an analogue to law in which the chess referee corresponds to the judge, Dworkin describes the play of conventions in this way, "But these conventions will run out, and they may run out before the referee finds enough to decide the case….It is important to see, however, that these conventions run out in a particular way. They are not incomplete, like a book whose last page is missing, but abstract, so that their full force cannot be captured in a concept that admits of different conceptions; that is in a contested concept." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 103 (1978) (emphasis in original). Dworkin takes the phrase "contested concept" from an earlier article by W.B. Gallie. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167, 167-168 (1956) . the clause the meaning it took on. This meaning did not cease to be contested, but nevertheless had a continuity and consistency over time deriving from the original dialogue.
This continuity and consistency, in turn, set the bounds of argument concerning the clause and created the rhetoric that was used in that argument. Like the gist of a conversation, the meaning of a constitutional provision can be derived (to the extent that it can be derived) from the interplay of statements and understandings that went into it.
Contextual, background facts can also affect textual understanding and meaning. In the case of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Constitution alters the framework of the Articles of Confederation, which granted Congress only powers expressly delegated by the states.
127 By the ratification of the Constitution, Congress acquired implied as well as express powers. The scope of these powers has been 128 the question ever since. In addition, textual constitutional meaning can also be affected by intratextual 129 considerations. So, in the case of the Necessary and Proper Clause, one reason not to take the word "necessary" in the clause to mean "absolutely necessary" is the fact that the phrase "absolutely necessary" appears elsewhere in the document. 130 The presence of the phrase "absolutely necessary" in the Impost Clause demonstrates that the framers were quite capable of clearly indicating absolute necessity when they wished to do so. If the framers had meant "absolutely necessary" when they said only "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Impost Clause indicates that they would have said so. Since they did not do so, from an intratextual 127 ART. CONFEDERATION, art. II ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."). 128 As with Edmond Randolph's "eternal question." See supra note 100 and accompanying text. perspective, it seems that the framers meant instead to invoke a lesser degree of necessity by merely saying "necessary." John Marshall famously makes this argument in McCulloch.
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Marshall also cites intratextual uses of "necessary" and its synonym, "needful," elsewhere in the Constitution to buttress his point. 132 This intratextual inference is reinforced by the acquisition by Congress of implied as well as express powers in the change from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution. Neither factor, though, suggests that the Constitution, in general, or the Necessary and Proper Clause, in particular, gives Congress unlimited power.
This background, like the setting of a conversation, helps us to better ascertain and understand the meaning of "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause and, in this way, specify the somewhere between absolute necessity and mere convenience in which moderate necessity lies, but it does not standing alone, accomplish that specification. The obvious and most productive place to that is the ratification debate itself. In that debate, as was recounted above, there were three main original meanings given of the word "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause-absolute necessity, moderate necessity and mere convenience. 133 The more contentious question is what to do with these three meanings. The reasonable person device of the New Originalism tells us to pick the one that reasonable person of the founding era would select. But how can this be done, other than by "looking for one's friends," when reasonable real persons of the founding era were of three minds as to this meaning? Unless the New Originalists have some convincing decision procedure to select among these meanings, which they do not, any selection is arbitrary.
The mistake of New Originalism is to assume that we must select one of the several conflicting public meanings of the founding era and then ignore the others. The better course would be to take in the fullness and diversity of meaning in this debate in order to understand the meaning that is larger than any single person or any single definition. Federalist
Congressman William Smith expressed this idea in an early congressional discussion of constitutional interpretation when he said that finding the meaning of the Constitution required determining "the general sense of the whole nation at the time the Constitution was formed" and that this, in turn, could be found through "the contemporaneous exposition of that instrument." 134 In order to accomplish Smith's task of contemporaneous exposition, our search for meaning must encompass the various positions in the debate and their interplay so that we can see the meaning which arises from this process. Originalisms which see meaning as a set, objective fact cannot readily do this.
The difference here is analogous to that between a moving picture and a snapshot. The determination of public meaning involves the explication of synchronic elements, i.e., relating and resolving different meanings found at the same time-here, the ratification period. Especially when it involves old texts like the Constitution, it must also explicate diachronic elements of meaning, i.e., evolution and other changes of meaning over time. New
Originalism, like most other forms of originalism in their own ways, "solves" the synchronic thesis, the view that "the original meaning was fixed or determined at the time each provision of the constitution was framed and ratified." 135 This fixation thesis cannot, however, readily accommodate, because it does not recognize, the fact of evolving constitutional meaning and doctrine over time. 136 New Originalist responses to both synchronic and diachronic constitutional meaning issues involve resolution by fiat in the face of contradictory evidence.
Turning once again to the Necessary and Proper Clause, we see that if we look at the meanings proffered at both extremes in the debate over the meaning of "necessary" in that clause, we find that persons on both extremes were motivated by the same concern that federal power in the proposed Constuitution was, as An Old Whig put it, "undefined, unbounded, and immense," 137 in large part because of the clause. Anti-Federalists opposed the ratification of the Constitution because of their fear and dislike of federal power. 138 The insistence of Thomas Jefferson and others that the word "necessary" in the Necessary and
Proper Clause should be read as meaning "absolutely necessary" 139 may initially seem to be diametrically opposed to the Anti-Federalist worry of the federal government having unlimited power. Yet it is, in fact, based upon the belief that the strict "absolutely necessary" definition of "necessary" was required to limit the federal government to its delegated and enumerated powers. 140 Both positions, then, arose from concerns about the scope of federal power. In this way, the ratification debate concerning the Necessary and Proper Clause was one of both ends against the middle with the two extremes united in their doubt as to the existence of a realistic limitation on federal power under the proposed Constitution.
The task of Federalist proponents of the Constitution in the ratification debate was to explain and convince the doubters that there were ascertainable limits to federal power. In that debate, it was not enough to simply assert that this power fell "somewhere" between the two extremes of absolute necessity and mere convenience. To that end, the Constitution's supporters employed familiar notions from agency law and other branches of law of the time to illustrate and specify the limitations on federal power they held that the Constitution contained and, thus, mollify these doubters. As Randy Barnett summarizes it, "Federalist supporters of the Constitution repeatedly denied the charge that all discretion over the scope of its powers effectively resided in Congress. They insisted that the Necessary and Proper See GARY LAWSON, ET AL., supra note 142, at 64 ("'Necessary' was a term of art, referring to any of three different situations. The first situation was when the putative incident was indispensable to the use of the principal.") (emphasis in original). 152 See id. at 65 ("The second situation in which a subordinate interest was deemed 'necessary,' and therefore incident to, the principal was if the absence of the subordinate interest would impair the value of the principal enough that the owner of the principal would suffer 'great prejudice.'"). 153 See id. ("The third kind of situation in which an interest was 'necessary,' and therefore incident to, the principal was if it was customary to the use of the principal, even if, objectively considered, there was little actual necessity.") (emphasis in original). 154 Id. at 93. 155 See id. at 109 ("Requiring laws to accord with fiduciary duty also was consistent with Federalist representations that the Necessary and Proper Clause was without substantive force. It was standard Whig theory that any measure by which a government violated its fiduciary obligations was inherently void. So just as the word 'necessary' merely informed the reader of incidental powers Congress would have enjoyed without the Clause, the word 'proper' reminded the reader of limitations that would have existed without it.").
156 RANDY E. BARNETT, supra note 88, at 186. Randolph, "But the question respecting the extent of powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our system shall exist." Gunther ed., 1969) . 163 McCulloch at 405.
